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AMERICAN STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, OF TRUSTS FOR ACCUMULATION AND OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
Louis BARCROFT RUNK t
The so-called rule against perpetuities had its origin in a decision by
Lord Chancellor Nottingham in 168i, and while originally judge-made law,
is now universally recognized as part of the common law. Closely related
to this rule, but purely statutory, are trusts for accumulation, the duration of
which under some statutes is limited to a shorter period than that prescribed
by the rule against perpetuities. The so-called "spendthrift trust" is an
American exotic with only a century of growth behind it.
As the original forms of all of these have been modified in many states
by recent legislation, the purpose of this article is to briefly summarize these
statutory changes down to date, subject to the limitations of the average
indices to the Pamphlet Laws issued since the latest editions of compiled or
annotated statutes in the various states, and then to surmise the underlying
causes that led to their enactment.
The Rule Against Perpetuities
In the following twenty-three states there are either no statutes or code
provisions, or they recite in substance the common law rule as laid down in
the Duke of Norfolk's Case and in the cases that shortly followed: Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania,2 Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. And the District of Columbia
may be added to this list, as its code recites the common law rule. Georgia,
intended to declare the common law, but
Iowa afid Kentucky passed statutes,
3
their language is not at all clear.
tA. B., 1893, M. A., 19o3, Yale University; LL. B., 1896, University of Pennsylvania;
author of Differing Federal and State Interpretations of the Transfer Inheritance Tax Ap-

plied to Trusts Inter Vivos (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. x85.
'Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Cas. Ch. I, 2 Swanst. *454 (1818) ; PErRy, TRUSTS (7th ed.
1929) §§ 379-80.
'In Pennsylvania in the 1931 session of the Legislature, a bill was introduced providing
that, for estates or interests created after its taking effect, "no estate or interest in real or
personal property created by any deed, will or other 'instrument in writing subject to a condition precedent before it shall finally vest, shall be legal ind valid unless the length of time
elapsing between the commencement of the estate or interest and its final vesting is limited
strictly to the period of a life in being at its commencement and one year thereafter. Any
limitation beyond such period shall be deemed a perpetuity and shall be void." (H. B. 892) ;
but it died in the Committee on Judiciary General to which it had been referred. See also
Lawrence Est., 136 Pa. 354, 2o Atl. 521 (189o) and Gerber's Est., 196 Pa. 366, 46 Atl. 497
(190o).
I GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 3678; IowA C61E (1927) § 10127; Ky. STAT, (Carroll, 1922) § 2360. See GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PEmPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 735-737.
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On the other hand, "perpetuities" are forbidden by the constitutions of
Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas,' but their courts define
"perpetuities" by the common law rule.' The constitution of Nevada 6 per7
mits them only "for eleemosynary purposes". Louisiana's constitution
permits its legislature to "authorize the creation of trust estates for a period
not exceeding ten years after the death of the donor; provided, that where a
natural person is the direct beneficiary said period may be made to extend
until ten years after his majority"; excepting, however, from the operation of
this provision, donations for educational, charitable or religious purposes;
but no statute has yet been passed.
Of the remaining sixteen states, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota limit vested estates, in language almost
identical, to "the continuance of the lives of the persons in being at the
creation of the limitation or condition" ; while New Mexico ' provides that
"whenever a conveyance or bequest is made wherein the conveyor or testator
shall hold possession of property, be it lands or tenements, . . . each one
of said conveyances or bequests shall only invest the conveyors or testators
. and at the death of said conwith possession during their lifetime,
veyor or testator said lands and tenements shall descend to the children ...
to be equally divided among them as absolute tenants in common". California 10 restricts them to "the continuance of the life of persons in being at
creation of the condition; or for a period not to exceed twenty-five years
from the time of creation of the suspension" ; Wisconsin," to "continuance
of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estate and thirty years thereafter"; Ohio, 1 2 to "such person or persons . . . as are in being or to the
immediate issue or descendants of such as are in being at the time of making
such deed or will." New York's rule 13 has long beefi for "two lives in
being", and an act passed by the 1931 session of the New York legislature to
change their rule to accord with the common law rule was vetoed by the
governor. Arizona 14 prescribes "the continuance of two lives in being at
'ARx.CoNsT. art. 2, § 1g; N. C. CoNsT., art.
CONST., art. I, § 26.

i,§ 31;

TENN. CONsT., art. i, § 22; TFx.

'Moore v. Moore, 59 N. C. 132 (186o) ; Munger v. Munger, 298 S. W. 470 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927); Eager v. McCoy, i43 Tenn. 693, 228 S. W. 709 (920).
. Art. 15, § 4; NEv. CoMP. LAWs (Hillyer, 1929) § 372.
'Adopted 192I, art. iv, § 16. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 766-772.
§§ 5335, 5340-5342; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
'IDAHO COMP. STAT. (919)
§ 13416; MONT. Ray. CODES (Choate, i92i) §§ 67o5, 6706, 6734, 6736; N. D. ComP. LAws
ANN. (1913) §§ 5287-5289, 5315; OKLA. CoMP. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1926) §§ 8410-8413; S.
D. REv. CODE (1919) §§ 294-295, 320-322, 324.
IN. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) §§ 117.107, 114.
1oCA. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) §§ 715, 770, 772.
'WIs. STAT. (1929) §§230.15, 230.16.
I Oulo ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, i93o) § 8622.
IN. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o); REAL PROPERTY LAW (909) §42.3; MCKINNEY,
CONS. LAWS, Vol. 49; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1909) § II; MCKINNEY, CONS. LAWS.
vol. 40. See also In re Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (19og). The statutory provisions are quite involved and have produced much litigation.
' Az. REV. CODE (Struckmyer, 1928) § 2761.
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the creation of the estate and twenty-one years thereafter". Four states limit
such trusts to real estate only, viz., Michigan and Minnesota, to "two lives in
being at the creation of the trust"; Mississippi, to "a succession of donees,
then living and upon the death of the last of said successors, to any person
or any heir" ; and Alabama "to the wife and children or children only . . .",
and to "the heirs of the body of the survivor, if they come of age, and in
default thereof, over", but to others than these then not "beyond three lives
in being at the date of the conveyance and ten years thereafter." 15
In certain of these states, ziz., Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota and Wisconsin, there are also special provisions that a contingent
remainder in fee can follow a prior remainder in fee, providing that it takes
effect in the event of the party having the first remainder dying under the
age of twenty-one, the exact language of these statutes being found in the
numbered sections of the laws of these states above cited.
It is interesting to note that in seventeen of the forty-eight states, more
than one-third, the old common law against perpetuities has been changed in
some way.
Accumulations
In England, the Law of Property Act of 1925 has re-enacted substantially similar provisions as were in the old Thelluson Act,' 6 which was never
part of the common law but served as a partial foundation for the slightly
varying statutes in the fourteen states which have express statutes or constitutional provisions on this subject. These accumulations are limited as
follows: in Alabama, for ten years or during a minority;17 in Arizona and
Wisconsin,' s for real estate during a minority, or for twenty-one years if
for certain defined charities; in California,' the same as their statutory rule
against perpetuities; in Illinois, 2 0 during the lives of the grantor or settlor or

for twenty-one years after the death of a settlor or testator, or during a
minority; in Michigan and Minnesota, 21 as to real estate only during a
minority, the statute not applying to personalty where the rule against perpetuities is held to govern; Pennsylvania's rule is "the life or lives of any
'MicH.

Comp. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §§ 11533, 11534; Miss. Code
§ 6922; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 8045, 8o46.

of 193o, § 2117; ALA.

CIV. CODE (1928)

Ag to personalty, the common law rule would govern in all four states.
1
1AccuMULATIONs ACT, 39 & 4o GEo. III, c. 98 (1900), 22 HALSBURY,
ENGLAND, 370. See PERRY, op. cit. supra note I, at 394-395.
17
ALA. CODE (1928) § 6914.
",Riz. REv. CODE (1928) § 2773; WIS. STAT. (1929) § 230.37.
"'CA. STAT. AND AMEND. TO CODES (1929) C.
20'2 SMITH-HURD ANN. STAT. (1930) c. 30,
1

THE LAws oF

143.

§

153.

CoMp. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §§ 11555, 11556; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552,
.2 N. W. 814 (1879) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 8O66, 8o67; Congdon v. Congdon, I6o
Minn. 34'3, 2oo N. W. 76 (1924).
' MIcH.
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such grantor or grantors, settlor or settlors, or testator, and the term of
twenty-one years from the death of any such grantor, settlor, or testator, that
is to say, only after such decease during the minority or respective minorities
with allowance for the period of gestation of any person or persons, who,
under the uses or trusts of the deed, will, or other assurance directing
such accumulation, would, for the time being, if of full age, be entitled unto
the rents, issues, interests, and profits so directed to accumulate" . . . and
the courts have applied the term of twenty-one years to all estates which are
22
not measured in terms of lives.

Montana and North and South Dakota provide, in language substantially
identical, that if the accumulation be directed to commence from the date of
the instrument or the death of the person executing the same, it may be for
the benefit of minors then in being or in being at such death, and to terminate
.; but if it commence at any period
at the expiration of their minority .
subsequent to the death of the person executing such instrument, it may be
within the time allowed for the suspension of ownership and at some time
during the minority of the person for whose benefit it is intended, and must
terminate at the expiration of their minority. 23 Michigan and Minnesota
have a clause substantially identical with this except that it is limited to rents
and profits, 24 but Indiana's similar statute applies only to personalty. 25 New
York limits accumulations for the period of minority, except for certain
classes of charities defined by the Acts. 26 Louisiana's constitution 27 might
also govern accumulations.
The remaining thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have no
statutory provision on this subject, but the rule against perpetuities has been
held to govern automatically in at least three of them, 28 and will probably
be held applicable by the others if the direct question arises.
Trusts for Public Charities as Related to Perpetuitiesand Accumulations
Such trusts are free from the operation of the rule against perpetuities
for both real and personal property, either by statute or by constitutional
provision, in the ten states of Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
' PA. STAT. (West, 192o) 18868, Act Apr. 18, 1853, P. L. 503, § 9. Also see Barton v.
Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914) and Lilley's Est., 272 Pa. L43, 116 Atl. 392 (1922).
I MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 6711; N. D. ComP. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 5292,
5293; S. D. REv. CODE (1929) §§ 297-300.
Supra note 21.
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 12172.
IN.
Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, I930), REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 6I, as amended by N. Y.
Laws 1915, c. 670; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAWS, § 6, as similarly amended, and also amended
by N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 384, 681; N. Y. Laws 1928, c. 172.
I Supra note 7.
'Wilson v. Di Atro, 1O9 Conn. 563, 145 Atl. 16I (1929); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me.
541, 50 Atl. 898 (Igoi); Helme's Est., 9.5N. J. Eq. 197, 123 Atl. 43 (1923).
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Tennessee, and also in the District of Columbia, 2 and in Massachusetts by
judicial decision as to personalty, and later by statutory implication as to
realty. 30 Also, in Arizona and Wisconsin, for certain literary or charitable
corporations of their respective states. 31
They have also been declared beyond the purview of the rule by judicial
decisions in fifteen other states, since, as they are not for personal or family
aggrandizement, the reason for the rule ceases. These fifteen states are:
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington
and West Virginia. 32 Mississippi, however, prohibits all direct or indirect
charitable devises and all direct charitable bequests, but trusts to others for
their use are valid as to personalty, although void as to realty. 33
With respect to accumulations for a public charity, Pennsylvania permits them "for any literary, scientific, charitable ox religious purpose", subject to legal restrictions upon their income and the application of the doctrine
of cy pres,which has been frequently applied.3 4 In Arizona and Wisconsin "
they are permitted for twenty-one years for certain corporations of these
I CON. GEN. STAT. (Rev. i93o) § 5000; Louisiana, supra note 7; MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 93, § 330, as to contingent remainders, and generally by Md. Laws (1931)
c. 453; MicH. CoMp. LAws (Cahill, 1915) § IIo99; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §8O92;
NEv. CoNsT. § 16.5; N. C. Cum. STAT. (Michie, 1925) c. 264; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 259o,
Act of May 23, i895, P. L. 114 § I. As to accumulations for charity, see PA. STAT. (West,
i92o) § :2.96, Act of Apr. 26, 1855, P. L. 328 § 12; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 37, p. 61; Tenn. Code
1932, § 9593; D. C. Acts of 193o, p. 356, § 312.
.Jackson v. Phillips, g6 Mass. 539 (1867) ; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 184, §23; cf.
Flynn v. Caplan, 234 Mass. 516, 126 N. E. 776 (1920).

For the management and accumula-

tion for one hundred years by the City of Boston of the Benjamin Franklin Fund, part of
which, now $476,o38, is to accumulate for a second hundred years, see City of Boston v.
Members of Franklin Foundation, 177 N. E. 557 (Mass. ig3i).
IAaiz. REv. CODE (Strucknyer, 1928) § 2761; Lowell v. Lowell, 29 Ariz. 138, 24o Pac.
280 (1925) ; WIs. STAT. (929) § 230.15, following the decision of Danrforth v. City of Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258 (1903).
'State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Chanc. 392 (1847) ; Cumming v. Trustees, 64 Ga. io.S (1879);
Richmond v. Davis, lO3 Ind. 449, 3 N. E. 130 (1885) ; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa 92, 61
N. W. 434 (1894) ; Wilson v. Bank, 164 Iowa 402, 145 N. W. 948 (1914) ; Troutman v.
DeBoissiere, 66 Kan. 1, 71 Pac. 286 (i9o3), 64 Pac. 33 (igoi) ; Bank v. Robinson, 96 Mo.
App. 385, 70 S. W. 372 (i9o2) ; Buchanan v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 136 S. W. 415 (911) ;

In re Hartung, 4o Nev. 262, i6o Pac. 782 (1916) ; Rolf v. Le febre, 69 N. H. 238, 45 Atl.
1087 (1897) ; Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. Eq. 447, 74 AtI. 447 (19o9) ; Davidge's Will, 200
App. Div. 437, 193 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1922) ; Brown v. Brown, 7 Ore. 285 (1879) ; Mason v.
Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671 (19Oi); Rhode Island Trust Company v. Warwick, a9
R. I. 393, 71 Atl. 644 (io9); Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716 (x878); Galland's Est., io3
Wash. io6, 173 Pac. 74o (1918) ; Mercantile Bank v. Showacre, lO2 W. Va. 260, 135 S. E. 9
(1926). The remaining states where, so far as searches show, the question has not directly
arisen, would probably follow the same course.
' Miss. CODE (1930) §§ 3564, 3565; Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 So. 737
(1895) ; Hailey v. McLaurin's Est., 112 Miss. 705, 73 So. 727 (1916).
'PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 259o, Act of May 23, 1895. P. L. 114, § 1; PA. STAT. § 2593,
Act of May 26. 1876, P. L. 211, § I; PA. STAT. § 2596, Act of Apr. 26, 1855, P. L. 328, §§ 4,
12; PA. STAT. § 2606, Act of Apr. 22, 1889, P. L. 42, § 1, and Act of Apr. 18, 1929, P. L. 539.
See also Burns' Est., 69 PITs. LG. J. 241 (0. C. Alleg. County 1919) and cases therein
cited; 2 PEPPER & LEWIS DIG. DEC. 28OO and supplements.
' ARz. REV. CODE (Struckmnyer 1928) § 2773; WIs. STAT. (1929) § 230.37.
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respective states. New York 36 and Louisiana 37 have been previously mentioned. Alabama's ten-year rule " would probably apply.
As to the remaining states, there are no statutes against accumulations
for public charities so far as searches show, and in those states where the
courts have held the rule against perpetuities not to apply to a public charity,
since the English Accumulations Act is not part of our common law, we
have no restrictions at all on such accumulations 39 except in so far as the
courts can hold any trust void for remoteness, 40 or, in so far as a court of
equity may limit the period of accumulations where, in its judgment, a sound
public policy demands that the period prescribed by the donor should be
shortened.
Regarding this doctrine, Professor Gray remarks, "The objection to
allowing a charitable fund to accumulate is an objection of public policy, and
it would seem better that the matter should be fixed by a positive rule of law
than left to the discretion of judges. The discretion which chancellors exercise is a discretion in arranging the claims of one individual against another,
not in setting limits to the operation of rules of public policy. It is a novel
head of equity." 41 While this is entirely true, the same criticism might
equally well have been made of the Rule Against Perpetuities when it was
first enunciated in 1681. Cases like these, however, are infrequent, since, if
the beneficial interest is immediately vested in the charity and only the pos42
Various other
session postponed, no question as to a perpetuity arises.
43
mentioned.
be
could
will
by
gifts
charitable
on
statutory restrictions
note 26.
Supra note 7.
Supra note 17.

'Supra

2 Perry, op. cit. supra note i, at § 738; Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846
(1893) ; Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320 (1897) ; Bur's Est.,
supra note 34.
" Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 (C. C. A. 3d, igio). See also St. Paul's
Ch. v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231 (1895) ; Norton v. Oldfield, 219 Mass.
374, io6 N. E. 1014 (1914), and Oldfield v. Attorney General, 219 Mass. 378, io6 N. E. Io15

(I914).

11GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 679a and 607; Tincher v. Arnold, 147 Fed. 665 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1906) 7 L. R. A. (N. s.) 471 (19o7) ; Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, I34 N. E.
276 (1922).
,2"Ibid.

' These interesting prerequisites to the validity of charitable gifts, but not strictly germane to this article are: California, will executed 3o days before death and not to give more
than one-third of the estate, if there are legal heirs (CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 1313,
as amended CAL- STAT. AND AxNuED. TO CODES (1931) C. 281, § 41); District of Columbia,
one calendar month before death (D. C. CODE (1930) 418, § 42) ; Georgia, 90 days before
death and not over one-third if there is a wife or issue (GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926)
§ 3851) ; Idaho, like Georgia, except 3o days and the wife is not mentioned (IDAHo Coiip.
STAT. (1g9g) § 7833) ; Iowa, not over one-fourth can be given to charity if a spouse, issue
or parent survive (IOwA CODE (1927) § 11848) ; Louisiana, the disposable portion by will or
a donation inortis causa, as the statute terms it, depends on the number of children or descendents, varying from one-third to two-thirds (LA. Rv. Civ. CODE (Merrick's 3d ed.
1925) art. 1493) ; Maryland, will must direct a special corporation to be formed in twelve
months from its probate (MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 93, § 337) ; Montana, will executed 3o days before death unless less than one-third of the estate is given (MONT. REV.
CODES (Choate, 1921) § 7015) ; New York, valid up to one-half of the estate, if the spouse,
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What has caused this flood of statutory changes in the so-called Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulations? Probably the same
fundamental reason that caused the original decision in the Duke of Norfolk's
Case,4 4 and also the original enactment of the Thelluson Act, 45 namely, the
ccnstantly recurring desire in successive generations of those owning property
to tie up its 'final disposition as far as .possible, and the contrary feeling of
the majority of -the legislators that in the public interest this -inclination
should be curbed. As to the restraints on accumulations, a California court
said :46
"The prohibition . . . was made to prevent an unfeeling and

selfish testator from so devising his estate as to make persons rich in the
distant future, to the detriment of those during the period of limitation
who had better claims on his bounty. The latter- had to live in poverty
in order that their children or grandchildren might be made rich at a
distant future day."
In many cases this tendency to tie up estates is due to a desire on the
part of the settlor or testator to preserve his memory as long as possible.
Most people rebel inwardly against the prompt oblivion that so quickly blots
out any lasting memory of the lives of the vast majority of their fellows. A
great many public charitable foundations have as one of their creative
motives this desire to be somehow or somewhere remembered in the next
generation. But such devises or bequests, being presumed to be for the
public good, are generally exempted from the Rule against Perpetuities, or,
in some states, are allowed to accumulate for a limited period.
In most cases, however-and this applies also to the "spendthrift trusts"
that will be considered later-the testator or settlor is unwilling to give his
children the full enjoyment of all the bounty.he has-stored up. He has seen
them gro.w up before his eyes from helpless babyhood, and ca.ni6t imagine
them fully capable of holding what he has acquired, so fie puts his property
in trust for the entire period of their lives in order that it will still be intact
at their respective deaths. He is unwilling to trust his own children, even
when they are of matureage, and in his blindness envisages the grandchildren
or great-grandchildren whom, in all probability, he *will never see, as being
a group of supermen or superwomen xho can be trusted much better. He
refuses to look all, the facts in the face and will not force home to his con-,
child, descendent or parent survive (N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, i93o) DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW § 17, as amended by N. Y. Laws -1923, C. 3oL; N. Y. Laxrs- 1927, c. 5 o2'; N. Y. Laws i929,
C. 229, § 3); Ohio, will must be executed one year before death (OHio AN.-. CODE (Throckmorton, 1930) § 10504) ; Pennsylvania, will executed 3o days before death and attested by
two credible and at the time disinterested witnesses (PA. STAT. (West, 1go) § 8312, Act
of June 7, I917, P. L. 403, § 6).
"Supra note I.
'Supra note I6.
"Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613, 624, 22 Pac. 50, 53 (i88g).
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sciousness the fact that under these rules against perpetuities and against
accumulations a group will ultimately come into existence and take when
they are of age the bulk of the property left in trust. The family moneymaker, who has graduated from the "university of hard knocks" (if the
expression may be pardoned), has the persistent feeling that his efforts to
save his children from some of the hardships he has experienced have in
many ways unfitted them for life as it must be lived, and have developed in
his children a philosophy of regarding their padded existences mainly as a
"chance for self-indulgence". We are the products of our heredity and our
environment, with the latter largely predominating, and if, with his influence
and example constantly before them, the settlor's or testator's own children
are not to be trusted, how much less capable and less trustworthy are the
unborn grandchildren or great-grandchildren likely to be, whose upbringing
may, be even more indulgent than that of their parents, and who, when they
receive their patrimony at twenty-one, are much more likely to squander it
than their parents would be had it been gradually placed in their hands,-part
of it at thirty, part at forty, and the balance, say, at fifty years of age? It
may take great tact to impress this viewpoint on would-be settlors or testators,
but if it is a correct one it should at least be tried. This principle, if carried
out in practice, might mean trusts of shorter duration, but it would mean a
greater number of trusts, in order to secure careful investment and constant
supervision of the corpus.
Spendthrift Trusts
The ancestral home of the spendthrift trust is in Pennsylvania. Its
chief characteristic is a proviso that the equitable title of the cestui que trust
cannot be taken away by any involuntary alienation. The title, though well
established in usage, is unfortunate. One unversed in modem legal terminology might momentarily think that a spendthrift trust was a trust for a
spendthrift, who is defined by statute in Massachusetts to mean "a person
who is liable to be put under guardianship on account of excessive drinking,
gaming, idleness or debauchery." 47 The definitions in some other states are
substantially similar, and there is sufficient confusion for an Illinois court to
recently explain the difference. 48 The average beneficiary, however, of a
modem spendthrift trust.is generally a respectable and much esteemed member of society who would be deeply incensed at having attributed to him or
her any of the qualities above delineated by the Massachusetts statute.
Professor Gray and Mr. Foulke are not in accord as to the case in which
4
the doctrine originated, but they are agreed as to its origin in Pennsylvania, 0
.' Mass. Gen. Laws.g21. c. 4, § y (86).
'9Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. IOI, 9I N. E. 66 (igo).
9

' GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (2d ed. 1895) 214 et seq. and Preface viii; FOULKE,
THE RuLES AGAINST PERPETUiTIES, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AND RESTRAINTS ON ENJOYMENT AS APPLicABLE To GIFrs OF PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA (i909) 267-268, 291-294.
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and in spite of the strictures of them both upon the doctrine, it has almost
filled the land. Professor Gray'50 considers its spread as a reaction against
the laissez faire doctrines held in the early part of our existence as an independent nation, but from the standpoint of a settlor entrusting his property
to a trustee, to be held for the benefit of a third person, it might be rather
held to be an illustration of the laissez faire doctrine itself, since it is grounded
on a man's right to do what he will with his own, and to stipulate the terms
on which another should enjoy it. Spendthrift trusts were not good originally in Alabama, Kentucky, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and Virginia, which held to the English rule that, excepting in the case of
trusts for sole and separate use, "the necessary incidents of beneficial ownership in property are liability to creditors and the power of alienation" ;51 but
two of these states (i. e., Alabama and Kentucky) have come into line by the
simple expedient of having deeds or wills drafted with provisions that, if the
income is threatened by attachment or otherwise, the beneficiary should
immediately be someone else, who might even be a very near relative of the
original cestui que trust, and thus feel morally bound to maintain him, and
in that form the deeds or wills are let alone, for a creditor knows that in no
event can he get anything.52 In no event, however, must the documents give
the original cestui que trust any incidents that usually go with absolute ownership, otherwise it will be held to make it liable for creditors' claims.53 The
other three states mentioned, viz., North Carolina, Rhode Island and Virginia, still hold to their original views, strictly construing any enabling
statutes. 54 But in the remaining states, as the question has been presented,
and in the Federal courts, the doctrine seems to have found ready acceptance.
The statutory limitations on the "spendthrift trust" may be summarized
briefly. In California, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin, statutes, substantially similar, have been enacted which provide that "Whenever an express trust is
created to receive the rents and profits of lands, and no valid direction for
accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum
necessary for the education and support of the person for whose benefit the
' GRAY, op. cit. supra note 49.

"Shelton v. King,

229 U. S. go, 96, 33 Sup. Ct. 686, 688 (1912).

"This can be best illustrated by citing, in each of these states, a late case, and then comparing it with an early case which held the contrary view. Alabama, Hartwell v. Mobile
Towing and Wrecking Co., 212 Ala. 313, 102 So. 450 (1924) ; cf. Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134
(i88o) ; Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 98 S. W. 1037 (19o7) ; cf. Parsons v. Spencer, 83
Ky. 3o5 (1885), the later case also involving a new state statute.
' Compare the following South Carolina cases: Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich. Eq. 46 (1851);
Symmes v. Cauble, 85 S. C. 435, 67 S. E. 548 (igog) ; Spann v. Corson, 123 S. C. 371, 116
S. E. 427 (1922). See also infra note 77.
North Carolina, Bank v. Heath, 187 N. C. 54, 121 S. E. 24 (1924) ; Rhode Island, In
re Petition of Smyth, 49 R. I. 62, 139 Ati. 657 (1927), reaffirming their old case of Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205 (1858) ; Virginia, Hutchinson v. Maxwell, ioo Va. 16g, 40
S. E. 655 (19o2) ; Honaker v. Duff, ioi Va. 675, 44 S. E. 9oo (igo3), and Dunlop v. Dunlop, 144 Va. 297, 132 S. E. 351 (1926).
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trust is created, shall be subject in equity to the claims of his creditors, in the
same manner as other personal property which cannot be reached by an execution at law." 5- Arizona permits such a trust if created by a father or
mother and for the benefit of a child or children, but a court can dissolve it.56
In Connecticut, it is provided that "whenever property is given to trustees
to pay over the income to any person, and there is no provision for accumulation, and the trustees are not expressly authorized to withhold such income,
and the income is not expressly given for the support of the beneficiary or
his family, such income shall be liable in equity to the claims of all creditors
of such beneficiary", 5 7 but the statute contains so many exceptions that courts
have had no difficulty in holding that if the trustees have the discretion to
accumulate income, creditors cannot reach it, so that their rights can be easily
nullified.5 8 In Delaware, the only law on the subject is a dictum of fifty years
ago that spendthrift trusts are valid only for the maintenance of the beneficiary."0 In Georgia, such trusts are only valid for a minor or a person non
compos mentis, or "any male person of age whenever in fact such person is,
on account of mental weakness, intemperate habits, wasteful and profligate
habits, unfit to be entrusted- with the right and management of property",
thus confining its application-substantially to the definition of the spendthrift
above given in Massachusetts, and the deed must be recorded and the court
can, on petition and proof to the contrary, dissolve the trust created for these
spendthrifts. 60 This provision only applies to males of intemperate habits,
as apparently Southern chivalry could not contemplate the possibility of an
intemperate female. 6 ' In New Jersey, the statute allows an execution against
a spendthrift trust "provided the income of such trust property shall exceed
63
$4000",62 but the validity of such a trust is still open to some question.
North Carolina permits anyone "by deed or will to cofivey any property,
which does not yield at the time of the conveyance a clear annual income
I CAI_ Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 859; Mice. CoMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) § 11577;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8092; MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 6788; N. Y. CoNs.
LAWS (Cahill, 193o) N. Y. REAL PROP-:RTY LAW (igog) § 98; McKINNEY, CONS. LAWS,
vol. 49, re-enacting a provision established in 1828, I R. S. (1836) 723, Uses and Trusts § 57;
(applied also to personal property) Williams v. Thorn, 7o N. Y. 27o (1877) ; amendment -of
i9o8, N. Y. Laws Igo8, c. 148, construed in Brearley School v. Ward, 2o N. Y. 358, 94 N.
E. IOOI (1911), aff'g 138 App. Div. 833, 123 N. Y. Supp. 614 (191o); N. D. ComP. LAWS
ANN. (1913) § 5369; OKLA. REV. LAWS (1921) § 8470; S. D. REv. CODE (1929) § 376;
WIs.

STAT.

(I92-7)

§ 231.13.

Aiz. REv. CODE (Struckmyer, 1928) § 3647.
"CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1930) § 5723.
"Foley v. Hastings, lO7 Conn. 9, 139 Atl. lO5 (1927) ; cf. Carter v. Brownell, 95 Conn.
216, III Atl. 182 (92o).
'Gray v. Corbitt, 4 Del. Ch. 135 (1871).
01GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926), § 3729.
I

a See Gray v. Obear, 54 Ga. 231 (1875).
N. J. CoMp. STAT. (1910) 2254, § 30a.
3L'Hommedieu
v. L'Hommedieu, 98 N.
therein cited.

3.

Eq. 554, 131 Atl. 3o2

(1925),

and cases
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exceeding $500, to any other person in trust to receive and pay the profits
annually or oftener for the support and maintenance of any child, grandchild
or other relation of the grantor, for the life of such child, grandchild or other
relation, with remainder as the grantor shall provide". 4 Virginia allows
it for any estate "not exceeding $ioo,ooo in actual value . . . but no such

trust shall operate to the prejudice of any existing creditor of the creator of
such trust."

03

West Virginia has, by a recent statute, adopted a substantially

similar provision to the Delaware dictum, which relieves from the claims of
creditors, trusts to be applied "to the support and maintenance of a beneficiary . . . in being at the time of the creation of the trust, for the life
of such beneficiary." 00 This statute, as do many of the others, exempts from
its protective provisions trusts created by settlors for their own benefit, an
exception which would probably have been made in any event, and which was
denounced in Pennsylvania seventy-five years ago 67 as violating the Statute
of 13 Elizabeth.
New York, as has been previously indicated, started out with a statute
permitting spendthrift trusts for education and support only,"' and this led
to several judicial pronouncements, which have been severely criticised, as
to what was a proper measure of support for people who had been brought
up with leisure and expensive tastes. The cases have been reviewed in an
able article in a leading law review, and so need not be touched on here."
Finally a statute was passed in New York, providing that where the income
of the beneficiary of a trust amounts to $12 a week or more, it may be reached
by any judgment creditor of the beneficiary by a special form of execution,
to the extent of ten per cent. of such income.7 0 And as the Federal courts
have recently decided that in a bill against a trustee service may be made by
publication under the United States statutes, creditors may in that state now
have a remedy which should prove really effective. 7
Finally, there are two states which by statute refuse to uphold spendthrift trusts against certain classes of persons. The first is Missouri, which
provides that "restraints upon the right of the cestui que trust to alienate or
anticipate the income . . . and all attempts to withdraw said income of
any trust estate from the claims of creditors of the cestui que trust, whether
81N. C.
G

CODE (1927) § 1742.
VA. CODE AN,. (1924) § 5157.

c. 36, art. i, § i8.
07Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (x862), and cases therein mentioned and which has
been often cited since.
O'Supra note 55.
Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust (1929) 43
HARv. L. REv. 63, which was followed by an article by the same author, Spendthrift Trusts
Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the Settlor (i93o) 44 HA~v. L. Rv. 203.
0 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (Cahill, 1925) § 684; N. Y. CODE CIV. PR0C.§ 1391; N. Y. Laws
1903, c. 461 as amended by N. Y. Laws i9o8, c. 148; cited supra note 55.
n Spellman v. Sullivan, 43 F. (2d) 762 (S. D. N. Y. i93o).
coW. VA. OFFIcIAL CODE (i93i)
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said restraints be by will or deed, now existing or in force, or, which may
be hereafter executed in this state, be and the same are hereby declared null
and void and of no effect, as against the claims of any wife, child or children,
of said cestui que trust for support and maintenance, or, as against the claim
of any said wife for alimony." 72 The second and last state is Pennsylvania,
the home of the spendthrift trust, which finally found that its rules applied
in strictness were allowing people to create such trusts at the expense of the
state itself,73 and passed a statute in 1913 which was amended in 1917, and
was followed by a more comprehensive Act in 1921 which provided that,
under court order, fifty per cent. of the income of a spendthrift trust was
liable for the support and maintenance of the wife and minor children of the
beneficiary and for the value of necessaries furnished to them or any of them
where said beneficiary has refused or neglected to provide suitably for them.74
And the last Act, which was retroactive, has been held constitutional but construed as to cover only citizens who might become a public charge .7 The
causes of these various statutes in the nineteen states enumerated were
twofold: first, the desire to relieve the state of the possible obligation of
caring for certain people likely to become pubiic charges, when there was
income that could be made primarily responsible for necessities furnished
them; and secondly, the desire to protect people who had extended to beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts credits based on their scale of living and
apparent means, since their creditors generally lacked other ways of getting
knowledge of their financial responsibility, as most deeds of trust are unrecorded, and the names of beneficiaries under wills--and especially if they are
married women-often afford no clue to the name of the testator whose
estate may be supporting them.
The reading of the American spendthrift trust cases about a hundred,
outside of the group in Pennsylvania-affords glimpses of skeletons in many
family closets which conflicting interests have forced into the blazing light
of court proceedings. The domestic trials and tragedies therein delineated
or briefly outlined are only surpassed in intensity by the rapidly increasing
list of decisions involving dispositions of property made or claimed to have

Mo. REv. STAT.

(1919) § 557.

Thackara v. Mintzer, ioo Pa. 151 (1882) and Board of Charities v. Lockard, I98 Pa.
572, 48 Atl. 496 (igoi).
"'Acts of Apr. I5, 1913, P. L. 72; June 7, 1917, P. L. 409, § 19; June 15, 1917, P. L. 614;

May Io,1921, P. L. 434. In the 1931 session of the Pennsylvania legislature a bill was introduced (H. B. 893) to make all spendthrift trusts subject to execution and attachment sur
judgment, sequestration or other process, and the spendthrift trust provision void as against
any creditors of the beneficiary; but this bill was never reported out by the Committee on
Judiciary General. The texts of the above statutes, and a review of the recent decisions in
this state on spendthrift trusts have been collected in Note (1931) 5 T~mprx L. Q. 626, so
further comment on the recent Pennsylvania cases is unnecessary.
IEverhart v. Everhart, 8; Pa. Super. 184 (1926) ; Smith's Est., 13 D. & C. 5o8 (Pa.

1930).
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been made in contemplation of death . . . tragic dramas in real life, in
which the two grim inevitables, death and taxes, play the leading roles.
There are many curious cases. Some of the early ones in the South are
based on the social structure which became extinct with the Civil War. Thus
an Alabama case in 1846 sustained the bequest of certain slaves under a
spendthrift trust for the benefit of the testator's son and his family during
the son's life; 7 1 but in a South Carolina case in 1858, where certain named
negroes who could not be removed from the state were put under a somewhat
similar spendthrift trust, it was held that a creditor could sequester them by
an equity suit-a novel application of the maxim that equity acts in personam. 77 In New Hampshire a court was finally prevailed on to fix a
maximum and a minimum within which a timorous trustee could function
without risking a petition for his removal on the ground of his unreasonableness. 78 And as the converse of the cases which provide that the income shall
not be subject to attachment for the debts of the cestui que trust, we find cases
where the trustee can pay over the principal when satisfied that the cestui que
trust is free from debt or when he has behaved himself properly for a specified
period.7 9 But the trustee cannot act arbitrarily or without a reasonably
searching investigation of the true facts.80
The psychologists have not yet studied the problem and charted definite
conclusions, but it is probably true that there is a certain loosening of the
moral fiber that ultimately affects the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust and
impairs both their civic value and general efficiency; and this deteriorating
tendency is in all likelihood passed down in increasing measure to their
descendants similarly protected. We sympathize with the indignant remonstrance of Chief Justice Ames, of Rhode Island, in 1858, in Tillinghast v.
Bradford,8 "Certainly, no man should have an estate to live on, but not an
estate to pay his debts with. Certainly, property available for the purposes
of pleasure or profit, should be also amenable to the demands of justice."
In line with what has been said, we may cite the following from the
s
opinion of Chief Justice Wilson of Minnesota in the Congdon case : 2
"The human race may well profit by using the busy honey-bee as an
example. The drone is held in little respect. No policy should be
adopted that would tend to make us a nation of drones. Idleness is the
Rugely v. Robinson, io Ala. 702 (1846).
v. White, Io Rich. Eq. 294 (S. C. 1853).
SEaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 216, 132 Atl. io (1926) ; cf.'Eaton v. Lovering, 8I N. H. 275,
125 Atl. 433 (924).
Brownson v. Gifford, 8 How. Pr. 389 (N. Y. 1852) ; Dunephant v. Dickson, 153 Mo.
App. 309, 133 S. W. 165 (igio); Eberly's App., no Pa. 95, I Atl. 330 (1885); First National Bank of Nashville v. Nashville Trust Co., 6z S. W. 392 (Tenn. Ch. App. i9ox).
"' Cf. Kerens v. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 283 Mo. 6oI, 223 S. W. 645 (i92o)
with8 Colket v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 39o (C. C. A. 8th, i93i).
SSupra note 54, at 2I2.
" Congdon v. Congdon, supra note 21, at 365, 2oo N. W. at 83.
7Wylie

UNIVERSITY

OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

It is better to adopt that policy
father of moral delinquency. . .
. It is best that the
that leads the citizen to vigilance and labor, .
Our policy is to
rash of ambition may develop on any citizen ....
guard against the creation of an aristocracy and to compel every individual in a measure to accumulate, and, at least, to sustain his fortune
by the strength of his individual superiority and ability, and to avoid an
artificial inequality of persons or a deterioration of character. The
tendency of restriction is to say that there is no objection to an individual
receiving a large fortune by way of gift provided he has unfettered
control of it. The theory of restriction is that the recipient should be
made to take a 'sporting chance' on his ability to keep it, without depending upon the prerogative of the dead. Responsibility develops both
manhood and citizenship."
In the long run, a man's good name is best handed down by the quality
of his descendants rather than by their quantity or the size of their bank
accounts, however desirable the two latter may also be. And if that is so,
then in successive generations, all protected by spendthrift trusts, the trusts
defeat their own ends, for the law of the survival of the fittest to survive
applies to families as well as to individuals.

